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The agency problem of listed companies in East Asia is closely related
to their typically concentrated ownership structures. Tight control creates an entrenchment problem that allows the controlling owners’ selfinterested behaviors to go unchallenged internally by the boards of
directors or externally by takeover markets. The primary objective of
this paper is to explore the association between the ownership and control structure and innovation. The ownership and control structure is
measured first as the divergence between the ultimate owner’s voting
rights and the ultimate owner’s cash flow rights, and second by the
presence of ultimately controlling shareholder’s family member as CEO
or Chairman of the board, or both. Innovation is measured by patent
quantity and patent quality. This paper uses patents granted by the U S .
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to measure innovation activities.
We find that innovation is significantly and negatively related to the
level of agency problems. We further find that innovation is lower for
firms whose controlling owner is also either the chief executive officer
or the chair of the board of directors. Our findings appear to be robust
with respect to examining patent count and patent quality variables.
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1. Introduction
While a significant body of prior literature has examined the association
between corporate governance on the one hand and firm value and financial performance (e.g., Core, Holthousen, & Larcker [1999]; Lins [2003]; Yeh, Lee, &
Woidtke [2001]) on the other, little work to date analyzes the effect of corporate
governance on firm investment, in particular, in innovation.’ Since both the
accounting and finance literatures argue that it is a well-accepted responsibility
of corporate management to maximize shareholder wealth (e.g., Jensen & Meckling [ 19761) within the framework of responsible governance activities, understanding the interplay between corporate governance structures and the
occurrence of such wealth-maximizing activities as corporate investment is important.* Understanding factors that may result in diversions of corporate financial resources provided by external financial stakeholders (e.g., investors and
creditors) is important as well, also within the framework of protecting the contributions to corporate financial resources of investors and creditors. Accordingly,
this study seeks to shed light on how different corporate governance structures
affect an important stewardship activity of the corporation’s controllers: using
corporate assets appropriately.
This study thus examines the relationship in Taiwan between corporate ownership structure, on the one hand, and innovation efforts and quality, on the
other. Here, innovation efforts and quality are measured by the number of patents
that the firm has received, the number of times its patents have been cited in
other patent applications, and the number of patent claims. This paper focuses on
corporate governance as a significant determinant of innovation efforts and quality in the context of what Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) described as
“insider economies.” These insider economies are characterized by smaller stock
markets, higher ownership concentrations, weaker investor protections, and
required lower disclosure levels.
The first objective of this paper is to explore the effect of a divergence
between control and cash flow rights on firm innovation. Prior research shows
that, at the country level, firms in weaker legal environments not only obtain less
financing, but also invest less in innovative activities. These investment patterns
in turn adversely affect the economic growth of a country (Claessen & Laeven
[2003]). It also becomes increasingly important, however, to understand the relationship between corporate governance and innovation at the firm level while
globalization continues and the world marketplace becomes increasingly competitive. The fundamental agency problems in most of the industrial and developing
1. Two exceptions are the papers by Claessen and Laeven (2003) and Francis and Smith
(1995). We will discuss the differences between this paper and these two papers in details later.
2. As Shleifer and Vishny note (1997, 737), “Corporate governance deals with the ways in
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.”
They continue: “How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest
it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers?”
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countries arise from the conflict of interest between controlling owners and minority owners (Haw, Hwang, Hwang, & Wu [2004]; Francis, Schipper, & Vincent [2005]).3 The controlling owners generally possess control (voting) rights in
excess of cash flow rights via stock pyramids and cross-ownership structures.
These greater voting rights give the controlling owners greater power and incentive to influence the decisions that the firm makes and to expropriate firm assets.
Issues involving divergences between cash flow and voting rights have been
explored widely in the finance literature (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, & Lang
[2000]; Demsetz & Villakaga [2001]). The governance and investment issues
involved here were of direct concern to Shleifer and Vishny (1997). The resulting uncertainty facing suppliers of finance may lead to reduced corporate valuations in Taiwan and elsewhere (Yeh [2005]).
The nexus between corporate governance and control structures on the one
hand and innovation on the other occurs because of owner entrenchment. Our
concern is that these effects may be negative. For example, developing the firm’s
intellectual capital and fund of salable wares through invention inevitably
involves diverting funds from other uses to intellectual-capital developmentrelated activities. Making such investments, however, diminishes the pool of cash
flow immediately available for enriching the entrenched owners (Shleifer &
Vishny [1997]). Therefore, it can be expected that the controlling owners might
devote fewer resources to intellectual-capital development efforts. Accordingly,
the firms could be expected to produce both fewer and less successful patents
due to the lower quality of their underlying ideas than do other firms. Given this,
we expect that firms with more serious agency problems, as measured by the
divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights, are more likely to produce fewer patents and to produce lower-quality patents than are other firms. In
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) terms, the more tightly controlled firms are making
poorer or more meager investments than the others.
Our second objective is to investigate the association between the presence
of the controlling owner’s family as chief executive officer (CEO) or chair of the
board and the firm’s innovation. The power of the controlling owner is further
fostered by employing family members in key firm positions, for example, as
CEO or chairperson of the board. This, and the ability of the controlling group
or family to nominate and elect family or controlling group members as members
of the board of directors, may provide the controlling group or family with the
ability to pursue their goals through the nominal processes of firm governance
described in the corporate charter. Attention to the conjunction of control divergence and family or controlling group presence in the top managerial position
reflects the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s OECD’s
(1999) conclusion that, in Taiwan, there is “an inadequate separation of ownership and management.”
3. Also see, for example, Faccio and Lang (2001); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (2000); Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000).
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In this paper, we use patents filed in the United States as a measure of the
Taiwanese firms’ innovation for the following reasons. First, prior studies show
that filing patents in a firm’s nonhome country provides a greater indicator of
innovative ability. This holds especially true in the United States (Grupp &
Schmoch [ 19991; Hall & Ziedonis [2001]; Watanabe, Tsuji, & Griffy-Brown
[2001]). Filing patents abroad is a greater indicator of innovative ability because
patents are far more complicated and costly to file in the United States, and thus
only the more innovative innovations are patented. Watanabe, Tsuji, and GriffyBrown (2001) note that in Taiwan and Japan, for example, many patent applications are pseudo-innovations. The latter are innovations that include decoys to
establish defenses against competitors. They note that Japanese and Taiwanese
firms apply for patents in the U.S. Patent and Trade Office (USPTO) in a selective way and do not include applications for decoys but only innovations that are
considered truly valuable.
The second reason we focus on patents filed in the United States is that such
patenting clearly protects the patenting firm’s invention from poaching by firms
operating within the United States. This is especially important because the
United States has long been one of the largest markets for Taiwan’s capital
goods and other mechanical and electronic exports (CIA [2007]), and was the
largest market for Taiwanese exports during our 1998-2002 sample p e r i ~ d The
.~
need to patent a firm’s innovations in other markets stems from the so-called independence of patents convention, which holds that a patent only applies in the
country in which the patent is granted.5 A third reason we focus on U.S. patents
of Taiwanese firms is that, should a Taiwanese firm wish to license its products
to others within the United States, it is important to make it easier for firms in
the largest capitalist economy (the United States) to discover the firm’s inventiom6 This is consistent with Watanabe, Tsuji, and Griffy-Brown (2001) argument that patenting overseas, especially in the United States, raises the patenting
firm’s visibility. The importance of patent licensing, with the resultant royalties,
is clearly laid out in Lev (2001). Lev argues that investors value income derived
from patent royalties up to three times higher than regular income. Furthermore,
Lev notes, patent income is more stable than other income components. Thus,
the incentive to patent Taiwanese inventions in the United States is strong.

4. See Ministry of Finance, Republic of China Web site, www.mof.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=
387 16&CtNode=l30&mp=6.
5 . This principle arose at the 1883 Pans Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as
a way to prevent one nation from rejecting the validity of a patent because a different nation had already rejected it (see 2001 Duke Law and Technology Review 0020, found at http://www.law.
duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2001 dltr0020.html. accessed September 6, 2007). The Embassy of the
United States in China states, “Patents, like other intellectual property rights, are specific to the country that grants them.” (The Embassy’s description of current patent law was found at http://beijing.
usembassy-china.org.cn/iprpatent.html,accessed September 6, 2007).
6. Lev (2001) provides insightful comments about the difficulties and reasons for licensing
intangibles, including patents. See also Gu and Lev (2001).
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Without it, the ability of the firms to benefit from sales of their product in the
U.S. market is diminished, as is their ability to enjoy the revenue stream from
licensing income.
Using a sample of Taiwanese-listed firms, the empirical results show that
greater control divergence will be associated with less innovation. We also find
that innovation is reduced for firms whose controlling owner is also either the
CEO or chair of the board of directors.
This paper contributes to several important streams of literature. First, in
contrast to prior studies (Francis & Smith [1995]; Claessen & Laeven [2003]),
this is the first attempt to examine how agency conflicts between controlling and
minority shareholders affect research innovation, using patent-related variables,
in a different ownership context than was studied previously. For example, Francis and Smith (1995) tested whether there would be differences in innovation
between (1) diffusely held firms, (2) firms with a high concentration of management ownership, and (3) firms for which a large part of the equity was held by
an outside investor. Their sample was drawn from U.S. firms.738As mentioned
above, however, differences between voting rights and cash flow rights are common outside the United States, but less common within it. This speaks to the
broad relevance of our research. Furthermore, the agency issues under study here
are consistent with previous research on the impact of governance structures on
corporate behavior (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny [1997]; Faccio, Lang, & Young
[2001]; Francis, Schipper, & Vincent [2005]; Ali, Chen, & Radrakrishnan
[2007]). Our work also reflects the OECD’s (1999) finding that there is an inadequate separation between ownership and management in Taiwan, with the family’s agenda often being the board of directors’ agenda. As this study reports, the
influence of family control on the firm is deleterious.
Second, we contribute to the literature on patent development and innovation
by examining the impact of other governance mechanisms on research productivity and innovation as measured by patent-related variables. That is, our empirical
findings indicate that firms with serious agency problems make relatively fewer
patent claims, cite others’ patents less often, have their own patents cited less often, and make fewer patents than firms with less serious agency problems. In
addition, prior research also argues that patent citations, rather than patent
counts, are more important in assessing the value of an innovation (see Trajtenberg [1990]; Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan [1995]).9 Therefore, we use these

7. Francis and Smith (1995) found that CEO-held firms were more innovative than diffusely
held firms with respect to patent activity. Francis and Smith (1995, 386) defined CEO-held firms as
“those in which the CEO and hisher relatives owned a minimum of 30% of the company’s voting
stock.” Furthermore, the diffusely held firms were less innovative than firms with a significant external equity holder.
8. Our paper also is different from Claessen and Laeven (2003) because they focus on countrylevel property rights to proxy for corporate governance, whereas this paper uses firm-level control
divergence as a proxy for corporate governance.
9. The number of patents is used by Francis and Smith (1995).

150

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & FINANCE

additional measures of innovation quality. Specifically, we measure innovation
quality by measuring the number of patent citations received and patent claims
made. These are discussed in greater detail in Section 2.3.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on promoting regulatory effectiveness. Our findings that possession of voting rights in excess of cash flow
rights leads to reduced innovation suggests, in this increasingly global economy,
that levels of innovation can be improved by leveling the playing field between
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. It follows, then, that our
findings can provide further insights to East Asian as well as Western policy
makers and regulators about the effects of concentrated ownership on research
innovation and productivity. Our further finding that control duality-having a
family member serve as CEO or board chair-leads also to less innovation suggests that regulators may find it useful to amend board governance regulations to
increase the transparency of board activities and to provide a richer information
environment.
In Section 2 we describe the Taiwanese economic and institutional environment, corporate governance systems in Taiwan, and innovation in Taiwan. In
Section 3, we develop our hypotheses. In Section 4, we describe our sampling,
data sources, measurement techniques, empirical models, and variables. In Section 5, we present our empirical results. Section 6 presents a discussion of the
research and our conclusions.

2. Corporate Ownership Structure, Institutions,
and Innovation in Taiwan
2.1 The Taiwanese Economic and Institutional Environment
The corporate governance system in East Asia is typified by a high concentration of ownership, family-controlled business groups, and a relative lack of
major institutional investors (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang [2000]).Family ownership or control is a common characteristic of Taiwanese corporations. On average, various family groups control 78 percent of listed companies on the
Taiwan Stock Exchange. In 57.6 percent of family-controlled companies, the
largest family holds more than half of the board seats (see KO, Ding, Liu, &
Yeh [ 19991). These results suggest that family ownership results in families
exerting substantial control over board decisions and agendas in stockholders’
meetings.
Taiwanese family-controlled firms use several methods to mask the exercise
of their control. This is important, given disclosure requirements in Taiwan.
These disclosure requirements include a requirement that Taiwanese-listed companies provide regulators and the public with detailed information about director,
supervisor, manager, and shareholder holdings. This disclosure is required when
the shareholders hold more than 10 percent of the company’s total shares. In
addition, listed companies are required to file with securities regulators, and
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announce to the public, transfers of stocks by directors, supervisors, managers, or
shareholders who hold more than 10 percent of the issuer’s total outstanding
shares. l o Thus, the controlling owners have an incentive to use available methods
to avoid disclosure requirements, thereby reducing the minority shareholders’
perceptions of the former’s ability to extract private control benefits.
The controlling owner has two methods that enable him to conceal his incentive and ability to extract private control benefits that stem from having
greater voting than cash flow rights. The first two methods involve use of crossshareholding and pyramiding arrangements and methods. The first method, crossshareholding, may operate as follows: the controlling owner first establishes a
nominal investment company, which is funded by the listed company the controlling owner controls. The nominal investment company then invests its funds in
the stock issued by those same listed companies (Yeh, Lee, & Woidtke [2001];
Yeh [2005]). Another cross-shareholding approach involves the use of crossshareholding by listed companies within the same family-controlled group. A
second method buttresses the ultimate owner’s control through the use of a stock
pyramid. Such arrangements leverage the controlling owner’s investment by enabling him to acquire a high level of voting rights without investing an equivalently high level of cash in the company through stock purchase. Specifically,
following Yeh (2005), Family A buys 20 percent of the shares in Company B. It
also buys 10 percent of the shares in Company C, which buys 15 percent of the
shares in Company B. Family A then controls 21.5 percent (20%
10% * 15%
= 21.5%) of the cash flow of Company B, but is attributed with control over 30
percent of the shares of Company B. Control rights, then can far exceed cash
flow rights given that the latter is the product of the chains of ownership while
the former are calculated as the sum of the streams of ownership (Yeh [2005]).
These methods allow the controlling owner to conceal the extent of his true voting rights holdings from the minority shareholders.
Another characteristic of the Taiwanese environment is the lack of major
institutional investor interest in corporate governance. While the role of institutional investors in corporate governance is receiving increasing attention around
the world, it remains quite limited in Taiwan. Only about 10 percent of stock
trades are conducted by corporate or institutional investors. Furthermore, there
are regulatory limits as to the percentage of capital that banks and insurance
companies can have in public companies. According to the OECD (1999), ownership by institutional investors constitutes only about 5 percent of total ownership. Furthermore, such market discipline tools as takeovers and hostile bids are
not effective mechanisms for corporate control in Taiwan primarily because of
the predominance of concentrated family ownership noted above (e.g., OECD
[1999]; Yeh [2005]). Accordingly, there seems to be little room for large

+

10. See Article 25 of the SEC Acts, found at the Law Source Retrieving System, Taiwan,
Republic of China, http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FLAWDATO2O
1 .asp (accessed September 30, 2007).
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independent financial institutions with good governance mechanisms to have an
impact on these family-controlled firms.
To this point, we have discussed various theories and research concerning
the separation of ownership (cash flow) rights from control (voting) rights. Even
when this distinction exists, for it to have an impact, there must be a mechanism
by which controlling owners can exert their power over the actions of the corporation. Two such mechanisms come to mind. The first is to install a member of
the controlling group (which in Taiwan is usually a family) as the chairman of
the board or CEO. This provides the controlling group with an important lever
of control over the actions of management. A second lever of control is to be
gained by inserting members of the family or controlling group on the board of
directors. Presumably, the greater the percentage of the board consisting of family members, the more likely it is that the family or controlling group will be
able to determine the direction of the corporation and otherwise safeguard the
controlling family or group’s interests. Yeh (2005),for example, found that when
members of the governing family constituted more than 50 percent of the board
of directors, there was a negative influence on the firm’s valuation, as measured
by Tobin’s Q. Yeh (2005) also found that when a member of the controlling
family served as CEO and chairman of the board, there was a further negative
effect on the firm’s valuation. Given Yeh’s (2005) findings, and Shleifer and
Vishny’s (1997) comments about mechanisms for corporate control, we believe
that our study should address the impact of direct family control (whether
through having a family member as chair of the board or through the level of
their presence on the board of directors) on a firm’s innovativeness.
To proxy for the extent of agency problem in Taiwanese firms, we focus on
the ultimate ownership and control structure of these firms. Although stockholders have fewer rights in Taiwan than they do in the United States, they have
approximately the same number of rights as the average reported for forty-nine
countries in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998). Thus, Taiwan provides a natural setting for examining the effect of entrenchment effects on innovation. At the extreme, we expect that firms whose ultimate controllers owned
relatively fewer shares, but had relatively more power over the fate of the firm,
would demonstrate the effects predicted here most strongly.

2.2 Innovation and Its Measurement
Taiwan’s national research and development (R&D) expenditures relative to
gross domestic product rank ninth in the world.’ I Taiwan’s outbound patent filings in the United States ranked fourth in 2000, following only the numbers of
patents filed in the United States by the United States, Japan, and Germany.”

1 I . See China Times, the best-selling newspaper in Taiwan, August, 24, 2002.
12. See Edstwood and Shiue (2002) for more details about intellectual property protection in
Taiwan.
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These statistics show that Taiwan’s innovation activities exceed that of most of
the globe.
This study investigates whether corporate governance in Taiwan promotes or
diminishes Taiwanese innovation. We use patent counts and quality as our measures of Taiwanese innovation. Specifically, our study is based on patents
patented by Taiwanese electronics firms from 1998 to 2002. These patents were
filed, and granted, in the United States.13 Patent counts have long been used as
an indicator of a firm’s technological capability (e.g., Francis & Smith [ 19951).
A growing number of studies argue that the more patents a firm possesses the
more intensive the firm’s innovative activities may be (Patel & Pavitt [1987];
Frame & Narin [1990]; Acs, Anselin, & Varga [20021). We use patent counts
here. Using patent counts has a clear, intuitive appeal as a measure of a firm’s
innovation outputs. As a measure of innovation, however, it has certain limitations in that not all patents are created equal. Accordingly, using a simple count
of patents alone as a measure of firm innovation may be misleading.
Tong and Frame (1994), for example, argued that a measure of patent quality, patent claims, would be more suitable than patent counts in accounting for a
firm’s technological performance. They argued that a patent is composed of a
bundle of claims, each of which represents a distinct technological advance that
is protected by patent law. Accordingly, each claim may be regarded as a separate patent (Rivise [1933]). The number of claims a patent possesses therefore
reflects the value of that patent. For example, Knight (2001) asserted that the
owner of a patent could receive a licensing fee by granting the license to another
to use the invention claimed in that patent. Thus, it seems that patent value can
fairly be measured by patent claims rather than just patent counts.
Patent citations are another worthy indicator of patent quality and, therefore,
of the firm’s technological competence, for two reasons. First, they are objective,
but not quoted at the whim of the inventor (Marie & Carolis [2003])14. Hence,
all parties have an incentive to cite the relevant innovation (Campbell & Nieves
[ 19791; Trajtenberg [ 19901). Second, patent citations are indicators of valuable
technological knowledge (Marie & Carolis [20031). The number of times a patent
document is cited may be a measure of its technological significance (OTAF
[1976, 167]), hence citations received may be telling of the “importance” of the
cited patent (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Fogarty [2000]). Empirical studies establish
the validity of patent citation analysis as indicators of technological competence.I5 Recently, Shane and Klock (1997) found that citations contained information above and beyond simple patent counts in firm valuation with respect to
13. We found that 99.42 percent of patents granted in the United States to Taiwanese firms
were granted to firms in the electronics industry.
14. The patent examiner, together with the inventor and the inventor’s attorney, arrives at a
final list of citations for every patent and this list limits the scope of property rights of the patent
owner and is protected by law. Hence, there is an incentive for all parties to cite the relevant state of
the art (Marie & Carolis [2003]).
15. See Carpenter and Narin (1983); Narin, Rose, and Olivastro (1988); Trajtenberg (1990).
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the semiconductor industry. Hall (2000) found that citation-weighted patent
stocks are more highly correlated with market value than are stocks or counts of
patents (see also Hirschey, Richardson, & Scholz [2001]). In this paper, therefore, we argue that citations received for patents cross-filed and granted in the
United States for Taiwanese firms are valid indicators of patent quality.

3. Hypotheses
Share ownership structure both delineates a firm’s agency problems and
impacts firm behavior. Previous research has almost exclusively focused on U.S.
corporations where share ownership is typically widely diffused (e.g., Francis &
Smith [ 19951). Therefore, the relationship between ownership structure and innovation productivity has not been studied in a concentrated ownership context like that
in Taiwan. Concentrated ownership is the dominant context outside the United
States, however, suggesting the broad implications of the findings reported here.
By contrast, in East Asian corporations, the high concentration of ownership
nullifies the principal-agent problem between owners and managers as well as the
related role of accounting-based managerial contracts (see Warfield, Wild, & Wild
[ 19951). Fan and Wong (2002), however, document their claim that concentrated
ownership creates agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors, as the controlling owners seek to appropriate a disproportionate share of corporate cash flows (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny [1997]). Our interest is in whether the
controlling or ultimate owners seek to divert corporate cash flow from more productive R&D activities, resulting in reduced patent outcomes for these firms.
A good deal of literature has explored the relationship between legal rules,
investor protections, and ownership structure (e.g., La Porta Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny [ 19971; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer [ 1998,
19991). This research indicates that the legal environment highly influences corporate ownership structure. For example, investors are relatively better protected
in common-law legal environments than in civil-law legal environments. In civillaw countries, raising capital is more difficult. This results in a concentration of
ownership (La Porta et al. [1997]) that impedes the development of capital markets (La Porta et al. [ 19971). Moreover, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(1999) argue that corporate ownership tends to be concentrated when legal rules
cannot protect investors. Claessens and Laeven (2003) further explore the relationship between legal rules and intangible assets. These authors find that developing countries have weaker law and order systems, lesser protection of property
rights, more poorly developed financial systems, and fewer patents per capita.
Taiwan, as a developing country in East Asia, also has a relatively poorer legal
environment, seemingly inducing family control (Yeh, Lee, & Woidtke [2001]).
The effects extend to many other countries, however (see Baek et al. [2004];
Lang, Lins, & Miller [2004]). The combination of poorer legal protections, less
well-developed capita markets, and concentration of ownership provides the
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controlling owner with the chance to exploit the minority shareholders with a resultant negative effect on the firm’s market valuations (Yeh [2005]). Thus, we
expect that the higher the divergences between voting rights and cash flow
rights, the less a company will succeed in innovating.
Investing in innovation is characterized as making investments of a longterm nature that are highly risky, unpredictable, labor-intensive, and idiosyncratic
(Holmstrom [1989]). Generally, there is a long lag between R&D expenditures
and research outcomes (e.g., patentable products). Once R&D investments succeed, the benefits for shareholders are evinced through dividend distributions and
capital growth. Thus, we propose three rationales to predict the relationship
between corporate innovation and control divergence.
First, given control divergence, the controlling owners have greater opportunities
to exploit the interests of minority shareholders, thereby slowing the f m ’ s innovation.
Furthermore, large control divergences will diminish the controlling owners’ motivations to foster innovative activities, because fewer benefits can be received from these
innovative investments. Finally, due to the risky nature of R&D expenditures, the
controlling owners will avoid risky investments that erode their short-term interests.
Second, the controlling owners tend to increase the debt ratio to prevent the
dilution of his or her shareholding dominance that would result from issuing new
equity (Du & Dai [2005]).The resulting poorer corporate governance, as measured here, resulted in weaker balance sheets in the East Asian region before the
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. In the event of a stock market crash and
the consequent economic fallout, the resulting higher leverage results in higher
bankruptcy risk and greater corporate value loss for the firm (Du & Dai [2005]).
The intangible assets developed through R&D have a limited ability to support
long-term debt, because they have lower liquidation values and value as collateral
(Myers [1977]). Accordingly, we expect that firms with greater voting-cash flow
rights divergence may have less access to the credit markets and will have a
reduced ability to invest in the development of intangible assets.
Third, Taiwanese firms are typically required to provide collateral when they
raise capital through debt. Collateral increases the risk of a given loan for the
borrower, because it gives the lenders claims on the assets without reducing his
or her general claim against the borrower. Stock that the controlling owner controls is usually used as collateral (OECD [1999]). When the stock market
declines sharply, the controlling owners must buy more shares to maintain the
stock price and hence the value of their collateral. Otherwise, they may be
requested to increase the amount of assets pledged to collateralize the loan.
When corporate governance is weak, corporate funds represent the easiest and
fastest funding for stock price support. Therefore, poor corporate governance
facilitates opportunities for the controlling owners to use the firm’s funds,
decreasing corporate value. This, of course, may increase the likelihood of financial distress (Lee & Yeh [2004]). In this case, firms with greater voting-cash
flow rights divergence have both less incentive and a reduced capacity to engage
in innovative activities.

156

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & FINANCE

These insights suggest the following testable hypothesis, stated in alternative form:

H I : As the divergence between the controlling owner’s voting rights and
cash flow rights increases the firm will
(a) possess fewer patents than other firms;
(b) have its patents cited by fewer patents filed by other companies;
(c) cite fewer patents in its detailing of the building blocks of its inventions
seeking patent protection.
The divergence between corporate cash flow ownership and voting rights is a
potential indicator of a concentration of power that affects the flow of corporate
resources toward innovation. Another important indicator is the control of the highest managerial positions by individuals related to the controlling family. It is possible
that firms for which there is a divergence between the voting rights held and the
cash flow rights held will be the f i i s that are tightly controlled by those who own
a disproportionately large share of the voting, versus cash flow, rights. This tight
control may be achieved by placing members of the family in high positions within
the company to ensure that the ultimate owner has someone in place who can
enforce his or her preferences. If so, then we would expect that having an individual
from the family occupy either the role of CEO or chairman of the board, or both, to
be negatively associated with the patent-related productivity of the company, as
measured here. This might be incorrect in that the ultimate owners of the voting
rights might prefer instead to use more professional management to run the f i i .
Francis and Smith (1995), for example, found that having the founder of the f i in
a top executive position did not affect the research productivity of their sample
f i s . Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001, 59), however, said that the controlling group
would have “especially tight control” if a member of the controlling group or family served as a top fm executive. Of course, the actual managers of the f i i ,
whether or not they were related to the controlling group, might work toward optimizing the long-term performance of the firm,and therefore seek to maximize its
technological advancement. The ultimately controlling owner also has the option of
choosing unrelated individuals to serve as CEO or as chairperson of the board, with
the expectation that these individuals would adhere to the ultimately controlling family’s or other controlling group’s preferences with respect to patent development policies and practices. If so, this would work against the relationship between having a
member of the family in the CEO or chairperson position and patent development.
To shed light on this issue, we propose the following hypotheses in alternative form:

H2: There will be a negative relationship between the presence of the ultimately controlling shareholder’s family as CEO or Chairman of the
board, or both, and
(a) the number of patents the firm will have in effect;
(b) the number of times its patents will be cited in patents filed by other
companies;
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(c) the number of other patents the sample firm will cite in detailing the
building blocks of its own invention while seeking patent protection.
We expect the relationship for both Hypotheses 1 and 2 to be negative given
agency theory predictions with respect to how controlling groups will behave
when the monitoring mechanisms are inadequate or the other stakeholders in the
firm lack the power to force the managers or ultimate controllers of the firm to
act otherwise.

4. Sampling and Data Sources
4.1 Data Sources and Basic Statistics
Our sample includes Taiwanese publicly listed electronics industry firms.16
The years of data in the sample ranged from 1998 to 2002. The corporate ownership structure data, including control rights, cash flow rights, and cross-shareholding
information were collected from the Taiwan Economic Joumal (TEJ) database,
company prospectuses, and Business Groups in Taiwan. The latter book is published annually by the China Credit Information Services LTD. Our sample firmyears meet the following requirements: corporate ownership structure data had to
be available from either the TEJ database, company prospectuses, or Business
Groups in Taiwan. The TEJ database was used to identify all electronics firms for
which complete equity returns and accounting data were available, as needed by
this study. The patent data of electronics firms were collected from the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Web site and the USFTO.'~ The above
requirements resulted in a final sample of 187 firm-year observations from 1998 to
2002. Some firms appeared more than once in our data set because they filed a patent application in more than one year. If so, the variables used were averaged
across the number of times that the firm appeared. Therefore each firm appears as
one observation in the statistical analyses. Without that averaging, our sample size
would have been 317, with the extra 130 observations reflecting the appearance of
many sample firms in the sample on more than one occasion. Introducing any fm
more than once was considered undesirable because it could lead to spurious correlations between the independent and dependent variables.

4.2 Measuring the Ultimate Owners' Control and Ownership Levels
The definition of ownership structure in this study takes into account not
only so-called immediate ownership (X buys a share of stock in firm Y and
therefore is the immediate owner of that share), but also more complicated forms
of ownership, including indirect ownership through nominee stockholders, holdings
held by wholly or partially owned subsidiary firms, holdings of family members
and others believed to be influential to vote in a certain manner. This focus on
16. As noted above, almost all patent activity was by firms in the electronics industry.
17. Please see http://www.nber.org/patents/ for the NBER U.S. patent data files.
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ultimate ownership is consistent with the ultimate ownership focus reported in
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000). The methodology that we use is also consistent with the Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) methodology, which followed that of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999). To do this, for each
firm, we identified what these researchers called the ultimate owners via a determination of each one’s share of voting and cash flow rights. Greater relative voting
rights give their holder proportionately more power to influence the decisions that
the fm makes. Proportionately greater cash flow rights give the holder the right
to receive a proportionately greater share of the cash being distributed by the corporation, or potentially distributable by the corporation. As Claessens, Djankov,
and Lang (2000) argue, control is a function of voting rights while rights to proceeds of the corporation are a function of cash flow rights.
In this study, again consistent with the methods used by La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer (1999) and Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), we collected information on share cross-holdings. We identified family groupings that
controlled firms in our sample. These procedures closely followed Claessens,
Djankov, and Lang (2000) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999).
The resulting understanding of the network of the relationships enabled us to
delineate the possessors of cash flow versus voting rights.
Following Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), we assumed that indirect
voting rights were equal to what the authors called the weakest link in the chain
of shares held by firms or organizations that were in turn under the control of
the ultimate owner. Thus if firm A held 20 percent of the shares of firm B, and
firm B owned 10 percent of the shares of firm C, we would attribute to A control over 10 percent of the shares of firm C. With respect to cash flow rights, we
again followed the Claessens, Djankov, and Lang example. These authors
assumed that if firm X owned 20 percent of firm Y, and firm Y owned 10 percent of firm Z, then firm X had the right to 2 percent of the cash flow of
firm Z.
In our sample, as in the studies of Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and
Fan and Wong (2002), Taiwanese corporations exhibited high levels of concentration of control. The average holding of voting rights by the ultimate owners in
this sample is 21.50 percent. As noted earlier, this result differs sharply from the
situation of U.S. firms (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny [1997]). Also in our sample, the
mean proportion of cash flow rights to voting rights (DEVRATIO) was 0.81,
clearly indicating that there is a significant divergence between the two rights.

4.3 Empirical Models
We chose three statistical approaches as our analytic methods for this study,
including ordinary least square (OLS) regression, logit analysis, and zero-inflated
negative binominal regression. First, we use OLS regression, which assumes that
data follow normal distributions. Second, we use logit analysis to examine the
association between corporate governance variables and innovation activities.
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Third, of our firms, two-thirds of them did not patent an invention in the United
States during 1998-2002. A given company that is coded as a zero patent company for a five-year period may truly be in the zero-patent state or may be in the
patent state (i.e., have a granted patent) but may not happen to have patented an
invention during the five-year observation period. Traditional statistical
approaches do not account for this two-state process and thus can cause biased
coefficient estimates due to the preponderance of zero-patent observations. Under
this circumstance, zero-inflated negative binomial regression has been used to
account for the preponderance of “excess” zeros frequently observed in count
data, and many studies have applied this model in various fields (e.g., Shankar,
Miltion, & Mannering [ 19971; Wang [2003]; Lord, Washington, & Ivan [2005]).
Thus, this paper also uses zero-inflated negative binomial regression to test the
relationship between innovation and corporate governance.

4.3.1 Patent Productivity and the Corporate Ownership Structure
The following model is used to test the relationship between the criterion
and predictor variables. OLS regression and the zero-inflated binomial regression
use eq. (1) as the basis for testing. Logit uses eq. (2) as its basis for testing.

INNO,,

= Po + ~I[DEVRATIO,~]
+ p2[FMLYCE0CHRlt]
+ p3[CTRLDIRlI]+ p4[LSHRHOLDER1t]

+ ps[EMPLOYEE#,t]+prj[AGElt]+

P(INNO,,) = PO+ [DEVR4 TIOlt]+ p2[FMLYCEOCHRIt]
+ p3[CTRLDIRIt]+ p4[LSHRHOLDERlt]
+ ps[EMPLOYEE#,t]+ p6[AGElt]+

(1)

(2)

4.3.2 Dependent Variables
We use three dependent variables to measure the effect of control structure
on research success, shown above as INNO. The first of these is PATENT#. PATENT# is defined as the total number of extant patents that the firm has, divided
by the industry mean. This ratio gives the success of the firm in generating patents, compared with other firms in the electronics industry. Obviously, the more
patents that a firm has received, the more successful in deploying its research
resources the firm has been.
is an indicator of the number of times each firm’s patents
have been cited in other patents, divided by its industry mean. The more times
that a firm’s patents have been cited by patents filed by other firms, the more
significant that firm’s ability to generate significant or seminal patents would
seem to be. PATENT,.p,piVCd,
therefore, provides a measure of the quality of the
firm’s research output. Firms that receive higher levels of patent citations are
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more successful, just as the more times a research article is cited, the more influential that article can be said to be.
PATENT,./,,,, is an indicator of patent claims, as it appears in the front
page of each patent. This specifies in detail the “components”, or building
blocks of the patented invention. Thus its number may be indicative of the
“scope” or “width” of the invention (see, e.g., Lanjouw & Schankerman
[2004]). PATEhTcI,,,, equals the number of patent claims divided by its industry mean.

4.3.3 Independent Variables
The models presented above test the effect of the governance variables on
the dependent variables. The remaining variables in the model are variables suggested by the literature as control variables, or by our hypotheses. Exhibit 1 summarizes the variable definitions. Extended descriptions of the independent
variables are presented below.

EXHIBIT 1
Variable Definitions
Variable

PATENTn,,d,
DEVRATIO
FAMLYCEOCHR
CTRLDIR
LSHRHOLDER
EMPLOYEE#
AGE
TOBIN Q

SALE
ADRD
DEBT

Definition
Patent counts divided by its industry mean
Patent citations received (number of times a firm’s patent has been cited in
other patents) divided by its industry mean.
The patent claims, as it appears in the front page of each patent, specify in
detail the “components,” or building blocks of the patented invention, and
hence their number may be indicative of the “scope” or “width” of the
invention (see, e.g., Lanjouw & Schankerman [2004]). PATENT,,,,,,, equals
the number of patent claims divided by its industry mean.
The number of citations made by a firm in its patent application divided by its
industry mean.
Cash flow rights over voting rights.
CTRLDUALITY equals 1 if the ultimate control shareholder family serve as
President or CEO, and 0 otherwise.
The ratio of the ultimate control shareholder family serving board of directors.
LSHRHOLDER equals 1 if the firm have 3 percent shareholder other than
ultimate owner, and 0 otherwise.
The number of employees.
The length of company history since inception.
Tobin’s Q is calculated using the book value of total assets plus market value
of equity minus the book value of equity as the numerator and book value
of total assets as the denominator, consistent with Doidge, Karolyi, and
Stulz (2004).
The natural logarithm of sales.
The advertising spending and research development expense over sales.
Total liabilities over total equity.
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DEVRATIO equals the ratio of cashflow rights to voting rights of the largest
ultimate owner. We use the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights of the largest ultimate owner to proxy for the positive incentive effect to under fund R&D
efforts or take other actions, or fail to take other actions, that result in fewer realized patent innovations (both in terms of patent quantity and quality). If cash
flow and voting rights are equal, then DEVRATIO will equal 1. The larger the
difference between cash flow rights and voting rights, the smaller will be the
value of DEVRATIO. If, as our hypothesis states, greater differences between
voting rights and control rights leads to less innovation, then the coefficient of
DEVRATIO will be positive, because our innovation measures will be declining
as the DEVRATIO value grows smaller.
FMLYCEOCHR equals 1 if a member of the ultimately controlling group or
family serves as chairperson of the board or CEO, and equals 0 otherwise. Having a member of the controlling shareholder’s family serve in a high administrative post enables the ultimate owner of the firm to exercise his or her power
through a family member, whom we can presume will be more willing to
respond positively to such direction. In Taiwan, the board chairperson is also the
president of the firm.
CTRLDIR is the ratio of the ultimately controlling shareholder family members who serve on the board to the total number of individuals serving on the
board of directors. It provides an alternate measure of the power of the ultimately controlling owner to influence corporate affairs. It is intended here to
serve as a control variable. Since the nature of board activity may be variable,
depending on the culture of the firm, the level of enthusiasm that individuals
bring to their board memberships, and so on, there can be no clear prediction of
the effect of this variable on the criterion variables. Therefore we offer no
hypotheses in this regard.
Taiwan’s Corporate Law 2 14 stipulates that shareholders who have continuously held 3 percent or more of the firm’s outstanding shares for more than one
year may initiate, on the company’s behalf, an action against a director of the
company. These stockholders may serve a monitoring role, helping to mitigate
agency conflicts. Alternatively, they may be allies of the controlling group or just
be passive investors. We constructed an indicator variable labeled LSHRHOLDER,
which is set equal to 1 if a so-called large shareholder of the firm exists, and
equals 0 otherwise. Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) noted that the presence of
other shareholders might have an impact on the ability of the ultimately controlling
owner to engage in “crony capitalism” (see also Maury & Pajuste [2005]). While
Faccio, Lang, & Young (2001) did not find such an effect in their East Asian sample, where the researchers tested the impact of multiple large shareholders on dividend policy, it is an issue that deserves to be controlled for here as well.
EMPLOYEE# is the number of employees of the firm. Francis and Smith
(1995) note that firm size is used to proxy for the amount of resources available
to the firm. It is measured by firm head count. The AGE of the firm is another
control variable, like EMPLOYEE#, that is suggested by Francis and Smith
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(1995). Age is measured as the number of years that have passed since the firm's
founding to the time of the patent being filed. Age of the firm may affect the
realized research productivity of the firm through practice effects caused by the
development of organized routines and an institutional memory that are conducive to research success. A contrary argument is that the firm's decision-making
processes may grow sclerotic with age, and therefore younger firms may have an
advantage in responding to technical advances in electronics generally, and
changes in consumer tastes in particular.
A capsule description of the variables used is presented in Exhibit 1.

5. Empirical Results
Altogether, there were 317 firm-year observations in the sample. When a
firm appeared more than once in the patents database, however, we averaged the
variable values by the number of times that the firm appeared in the variables
database. The resulting sample size was 187. Results reported below were robust
to alternate specifications of the model and the sample (see footnotes 16 and 18).
Table 1 summarizes our data. It presents the averaged values of each variable
used in the analyses, the standard deviations, and the values of each variable in
the first quartile, the median value, and the third quartile. This presentation gives
an indication of the distribution of data values in the sample.
Our univariate analyses showed that the average number of patents held
(PATENT#), patent citations received from other firms (PATENT,.,,.,i,,,n), and the
number of patents the sample firm will cite in detailing the building blocks of its
own inventions (PATENT,.,,,,,J
were 1.13, 1.O 1, and 1.02, respectively. The

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Ql

PATENT#
PATENT,.,.,,.d
PATENT, irrrn,\
PATENTm0,ie
DEVRATIO
FMLYCEOCHR
CTRLDIR
LSHRHOLDER
EMPLOYEE#
AGE
TOBlN Q
SALE
ADRD
DEBT

1.13
1.01
1.02
1.11
0.8 1
0.69
0.27
0.43
992
15
2.04
6.64
44.06
0.67

5.72
5.48
5.58
5.65
0.25
0.44
0.17
0.46
1,399
8
1.17
0.53
59.07
0.43

0
0
0
0
0.65
0
0.13
0
280
10
I .30
6.24
12.66
0.33

Median

0
0
0
0
0.94
1

0.25
0.2
495
14

I .76
6.60
26.87
0.56

43
0.10
0.03
0.10
0.1 I
1
1
0.38
1
1,153
20
2.46
7.06
52.29
0.91
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standard deviations for these variables were over five times the mean. The skewness in the distribution of these variables’ values is shown by the finding that the
median value for each of these values was 0, while the third quartile value for
each of these variables (PATENT#, PATENT,e,.eived, and PATENTc,aims) were
0.10, 0.03, and 0.10, respectively. The standard deviations of these variables
were 5.72, 5.48, and 5.58, also respectively. This suggests that relatively few
firms held the lion’s share of patents in the sample. A similar finding was shown
for PATENTm,d,, a variable introduced in the sensitivity analysis.
Our control divergence variable DEVRATIO had a mean value of 0.81,
showing that on average cash flow rights of the controlling owner equaled 81
percent of the controlling owner’s voting rights (standard deviation of 0.25 or
25%). Similarly, with FMLYCEOCHR, we found that 69 percent (standard deviation of 0.44 or 44%) of the firms had a member of the ultimately controlling
shareholder’s family serve as president (chairman of the board) or CEO of the
firm. With respect to CTRLDIR, which measures the percentage of the boards of
director seats occupied by members of the ultimately controlling owner’s family,
27 percent of the seats overall were held by family members. The standard deviation equaled 0.17.
Next, further data analyses using the various statistical methods and the
DEVRATIO variable itself are presented.

’’

5.1 OLS Regression Analysis
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the greater the divergence between the controlling owners’ voting rights and hisher cash flow rights, the less innovative (as
measured by patents owned, patents cited by other companies, patents that it
cites, and patents claimed) it would be. Table 2, Panel A, presents the results of
the three subhypotheses.” With respect to Hypothesis 1(a), patent count
(PATENT#),DEVRATIO was significant at the 0.01 level, consistent with our hypothesis. Given that the DEVRATIO variable is calculated as the ratio of cash
flow rights (the numerator) to voting rights (the denominator), then the greater
the relative number of voting rights as compared with cash flow rights, the
smaller the DEVRATIO value will be. In this case, higher DEVRATIO values
(meaning less of a divergence between voting and cash flow rights) were associated with higher patent counts, supporting our hypothesis. With respect to
Hypothesis 1(b), involving the prediction of patent citations received
(PATENTreceiVed),
again DEVRATIO was significant at the 0.01 level, again supporting our hypothesis. With respect to Hypothesis 1(c), involving the prediction
18. We also conducted a Tobit analysis of the models used for OLS, logit, and the zero-inflated
binomial regressions. Our results using Tobit were consistent with those reported within the results
section proper.
19. the regression equations generally suffered from heteroscedasticity problems, we used the
White (1980) methodology to adjust the ?-statistics to correct this problem. This was done, as
required, in all other regressions (Beckmann [20021).
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PI
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-0.696
(0.195)
-1.162
(0.083)*
-0.583
(0.237)
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(0.045)**
0.857
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(0.048)** (0.062)*
0.803
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(0.098)*
(0.043)**
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(0.142)
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-1.216
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0.001
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0.001
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0.001
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0.003
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(0.001)***
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(0004)* * *
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(0.000)*** (0.454)
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0.000
(O.OOO)***
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0.002
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(0.000)***
(0.194)

BS

-0.274
0.001
(0.248) (0.000)***
0.001
-0.361
(0.196) (O.OOO)***
-0.329
0.001
(0.212) (O.OOO)***
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-0.001
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0.198
(0.400)
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***. **. and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Note:

PATENT,,,,,s

PATENT,,,

PATENT#

Panel C: Zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses

PATENT,,,,,,,d

PATENT#

Panel B : Logit analyses

PATENT#

-3.599
4.544
-2.480
3.152
(0.017)** (0.002)*** (0.005)*** (0.105)
PATENT,yl.en,d -3.970
4.608
-2.449
3.346
(0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.154)
PATENTrlalmr -4.444
5.117
-2.799
4.151
(0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.060)*

Panel A: OLS regression analyses

Dependent
Variable

11.245
18.736
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187

64.79

57.38

-129.742
-130,909

62.83

- 147.275

26.9%

189.850
187

187
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26.5%

36.5%

24.9%

24.0%

185.396

194.794
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R2)
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187

10.760

F

187

N
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of patent claims
DEVRATIO was significant and positive at the
0.01 level. The greater the equality between cash flow rights and voting rights,
the greater the number of detailed specifications of the components or building
blocks of its own patents (PATENTcI,,,,). With respect to Hypothesis l(c), the
relationships between the other variables in the OLS model and the criterion variables are shown in Table 2, Panel A.
Hypothesis 2 posits that there will be a negative relationship between the presence of the ultimately controlling shareholder’s family member or group as CEO
or chairman of the board or both (measured by FMLYCEOCHR) and (1) the number of patents that the firm will hold (PATENT#); (2) the number of times the
firm’s patents will be cited in patents filed by other companies (PATENT,.,,,,,,d);
and (3) the firm’s detailed specification of the components or building blocks of
its own patent (PATENTc
The relationships between FMLYCEOCHR and all
three criterion variables were negative and significant at the p = 0.01 level for
PATENT#, PATENT,ecrrv6,d,
and PATENT(r,,,,. Thus all parts of Hypothesis 2 have
received strong support. The relationships between other variables and the criterion
variables, as well as the full models’ statistics, can be seen in Table 2, Panel A.”
In a test for multicollinearity, the variance inflation factors were under 2, as
they were in all the statistical tests presented. In addition, Durbin-Watson (DW)
statistics are used to test residual autocorrelations. The results indicate that residual autocorrelation is not significant. These results remain unchanged when we
reestimated the model using Belsley, Kuh, and Welch’s (1980) influence diagnostics to exclude outliers.

5.2 Logit Regression Analysis
Second, we use logit analysis to examine whether better corporate governance practices are associated with innovation activities. The dummy variable
equals 1 if firms with innovation activities measured by patents, patents received,
or patent claims, otherwise 0. As shown in Table 2, Panel B, DEVRATIO is significantly positively associated with innovation activities. The relationship was
significant at the p = 0.1 level for PATENTrec.eived,
at the p = 0.05 level for PATENT#, and at the p = 0.1 level for PATENTcl,im,F.This indicates that the closer
cash flow rights were to voting rights, the more likely the firm was to engage in
successful innovation activities, as measured by the dependent variables PATENT#, PATENTreceived,and PATENTcr,im,y.
With respect to Hypothesis 2, that there would be a negative relationship
between the presence of a member of the controlling shareholder’s family as
CEO or chairman of the board and the innovation variables, we found that the
FMLYCEOCHR variable was significant at the 0.05 level for PATENT# and
PATENTcl,im,F,and at the 0.1 level for PATENTreceived.All were significant in the
predicted direction.
20. We also conducted an OLS regression using only firms with patents during the sample period. The reason for this step is to secure the robustness of results. Hypotheses l and 2 were still supported in this analysis.
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5.3 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Analysis
Two-thirds of our firms did not have a patent granted to them in the United
States during the 1998-2002 sampling period. Traditional statistical approaches
do not account for this two-state process. Under this circumstance, zero-inflated
negative binomial regression has been used to account for the preponderance of
“excess” zeros frequently observed in count data, and many studies have applied
this model in various fields (e.g., Shankar, Miltion, & Mannering [1997]; Wang
[2003]; Lord, Washington, & Ivan [2005]). Thus, we also use this method to test
the relationship between corporate governance and innovation with the dependent
variables: patent counts (PATENT#),patent received (PATENT,., r,ved), and patent
claims PATENT,,,,,,^). The results are consistent with the outcomes of the earlier
analyses, supporting the hypotheses. The marginal effect of DEVRATIO and
FMLYCEOCHR were found to be statistically significant and the results are consistent with what we expected. DEVRATIO was uniformly and positively related
to the three dependent variables at the 0.01 level. The direction was as predicted,
positive. FMLYCEOCHR was negatively related to PATENT# at the 0.1 level,
while FMLYCEOCHR was negatively and significantly related to PATENT,,.,,,,d
and PATENTclarmsat the 0.05 level. The results are shown in Table 2, Panel C .

5.4 Supplementary Analyses
To ensure the validity of our results, we conducted several supplementary
analyses.

5.4.1 Causation Issues and Endogeneity
A potential problem with our analysis might be the question of causation.
That is, there might be an endogeneity problem in that we are arguing that the
divergence between cash flow and voting rights is predictive of innovation
efforts. It might be argued, though, that innovation efforts lead to greater issuance of cash flow rights-bearing stock to innovative personnel, leading to the
divergence of cash flow and voting rights. Following Lins (2003), we model the
control divergence equation as follows:

+ p1[ZNNOi,]+ p2[BETAi,]+ p3[ALPHAit]
+ p4[FMLYCEOCHRi,]+ ps[CTRLDIRi,]+ p,j[DEBT,,]
+ p7[EMPLOYEE#,J + Ps[AGEit]+ E

DEVRATZOit=

(3)

Lins (2003) argues, citing Demsetz and Villakaga (2001), that greater systematic or market risk may allow the inside controlling group (here, those who
hold greater voting than cash flow rights, as opposed to Lins [2003] specification
of managers) to benefit from any privileged or inside information that they have.*’
21. See Table 5 of Lins (2003) for his full first-stage model.
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According to Lins (2003) argument, this situation should encourage members of
the noncontrolling group (i.e., those with greater cash flow than voting rights) to
engage in greater monitoring of the activities of the controlling ownership group.
Accordingly, here as in Lins, beta values should be positively associated with the
differentiation between voting rights and cash flow rights in our study. The variable is measured by regressing firm returns on market returns over one year.
Our use of c1 in predicting control rights divergence also follows Lins (2003)
reasoning. If, as Lins states, c1 measures “past ‘excess returns”’ and does proxy
for expected future excess returns, then greater c1 values should interest both the
controlling and noncontrolling group of shareholders to amass cash flow rights in
the firm. Accordingly, a should be negatively related to control rights divergence, because the controlling group would wish to amass cash flow rights as
well as voting rights. The variable c1 here is calculated using a five-day window
of cumulative abnormal returns. The estimation period used is 300 days.
In accordance with Lins (2003), we also use debt ratio (DEBT) as a predictor. DEBT controls the positive tax-shield effect and negative financial distress
effect. Also, as Lins noted, leverage may reflect the ability or willingness of
creditors to act as external monitors of corporate behavior, therefore, as Lins
notes (2003, 179), affecting the likelihood of “observing ownership structures
that facilitate managerial entrenchment.”
Because we expect control divergence to affect innovation and vice versa,
we therefore estimate eqs. (1) and (3) as a simultaneous equation system with
control divergence and innovation as jointly determined endogenous variables.
Separately, we estimate eqs. (2) and (3) as a simultaneous equation system, too.
Table 3 reports the coefficients on two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions in
which the first-stage models contain a control divergence equation and the structural models contain the innovation equations.
No matter which statistical method was used (OLS, logit, zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses), the results of the structural equations were
statistically the same. The results show, therefore, that our findings reported
above are not driven by endogenous relationships.

5.4.2 Patentmadeas a Dependent Variable
To draw a more complete picture of the innovation, we created another indicator of innovation, PATENTmad,, which measures patent citations made to other
firm’s patents.22 Citations made may constitute a “paper trail” for spillovers,
and thus may be indicative of knowledge flowing among firms (Jaffe,
22. We also examined the impact of our prediction equations on R&D intensity, that is, R&D
expenditures divided by sales. These results, which are not shown, were consistent with the outcomes
seen using our patent variables. Thus, control divergence and having family members serve as the
firm’s CEO or chairman of the board predicted R&D effort, an input into the patent development
effort, as well as the outcome of the patent development effort. Accordingly, it seems that the more
tightly controlled firms were not necessarily inefficient or ineffective at producing patentable products, they invested less in the process of developing patentable and other innovations.
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Trajtenberg, & Fogarty [2000]).Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) also argue
that patent citations can be seen as providing direct observations of technological
impact and knowledge diffusion. Outside sources of knowledge are often critical
to the innovation process. Knowledge diffusion is defined as the number of times
a firm cites other patents in its own application for a patent. The greater the
number of citations made, the more knowledge the firm incorporates into its own
research base. Higher frequency in using other firms' research may serve as a
surrogate for higher quality of work. Accordingly, we propose that the more
other firms' patents that our firms cite, the more likely the sample firms' patents
are to serve as a contribution to the technological development of a particular
field. Thus, a firm that cites more patents granted to other firms is extending the
contribution to the field initially made by those other firms' patents.
PATENTmud,is the number of citations made by a firm in its patent applications, divided by its industry mean. The significance of this variable is that it
provides an indicator of the breadth of external intellectual resources used to develop its own patents, and therefore helps indicate the quality of the firm's patent
development effort. Our results using this variable were consistent with those
reported for PATENT#, PATENT,.,, ,,,,,d, and PATENTclu,,,. The results of this
analysis can be seen in Table 4, Panel A.

5.4.3 Tobin's Q as a Dependent Variable
We conducted an additional analysis to better understand the effects of differences between voting and cash flow rights on the firm. Specifically, we
regressed Tobin's Q on the following variables: innovation (INNO) to control for
innovation; cash flow rights held by the ultimate owner over voting rights held
by the ultimate owner (DEVRATIO);advertising and R&D over sales (ADRD) to
control for intangible assets that may yield future growth opportunities (Yeh
[2005]);the firm's debt ratio (DEBT) to control for the positive tax-shield effect
and negative financial distress effect; and the firm's size (SALE) measured by
the natural logarithm of sales, enabling us to control for any size effect (Yeh
[2005]).We entered 1NNO"DEVRATIO as an interaction term, because doing so
enables us to test the incremental effect of DEVRATIO on Tobin's Q. The prediction equation used in this analysis is as follows:

TOBZN Qlt= P o + pi[ZNNO;t]+ p2[ZNNO;t]X [DEVRATZOit]
+ p3[FMLYCEOCHR;t]+ p4[CTRLDZRlt]+ p5[SALE;t]
+ PdADRDitl+ PdDEBTit] + G t

(4)

The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4, Panel B. We found that
the interaction term of INNO and DEVRATIO was consistently and significantly
positively related to TOBIN Q. Given that INNO itself was positively related to
TOBIN Q , suggesting that greater numbers and quality of patents leads to greater
firm valuation, the positive relationship between the INNO"DEVRATI0
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interaction term suggests that greater control divergence is negatively related to
the firm’s valuation. The negative impact of voting control versus cash flow
divergence on TOBIN Q is consistent with Yeh’s (2005) finding.

5.4.4 Other Influences on Innovative Activity
We further examined the influence of both (1) the percentage of firm export sales
to total sales and ( 2 ) the trading of Taiwanese firm stocks on the U.S. stock exchanges
on patenting activity. Our concern was that high export sales and listings on U.S.
exchanges would expose the firm to greater U.S. and other nowTaiwanese government regulations that would confound the impact of other variables on our results.23
As Watanabe, Tsuji, and Griffy-Brown (2001) and Grupp and Schmoch
(1999) argued, non-U.S. firms have significant reasons for seeking patent protection in other countries, especially the United States. Listing on a U.S. stock
exchange may accentuate this effect since doing so may expose these firms to
liabilities under U.S. security laws and other regulations while they are listed in
the U.S. markets (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE] or the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation [NASDAQ] system). For
example, Hostak, Karaoglu, Lys, and Yang (2007) found that foreign firms with
weaker corporate governance systems were more likely to delist their firms than
were firms with stronger corporate governance systems to avoid complying with
Sarbanes-Oxley requirements. Therefore, we also use two additional variables to
control for this effect. Specifically, we add EXPORT and ADR to our models.
EXPORT is defined as foreign sales divided by total sales. If a firm is also listed
on NYSE or NASDAQ via the issuance of American depositary receipts (ADRs),
then ADR is set equal to 1, and otherwise 0.
We found that the inclusion of these two additional control variables did not
change the qualitative nature of our results, reported above.

6. Conclusion
Taiwan is one of the so-called Seven Tigers, nations whose economic
growth has energized the economies of East Asia. The lessons learned from this
study are applicable around the globe. This study demonstrates that the level of
investment is partially determined by the governance structure of firms making,
or not making, the investments. “Insider economies,” as Leuz, Nanda, and
Wysocki (2003) termed them, may damage their future prospects because of the
divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights of the controlling owner.
This has important implications for nations around the globe since, as globalization continues, the need to intensify investment in new products and ideas should
increase. As such, regulators need to take note of the effect of the kind of control
divergences described here and take remedial or preventive actions.
23. We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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The results of the study reported here, however, indicate that the characteristic patterns of close family or group control over electronic firms in Taiwan may
be putting a damper on Taiwan’s economic development. The results show that
the greater the divergence (however measured) between voting and cash flow
rights, the lower (1) the quantity of patents received, and (2) the quality-as
measured by patent citations received and given, and patent “claims.” The
obvious implication of this is that such tight control reduces the innovativeness
of the electronic firms in the sample. Because the Taiwanese pattern of close
control of corporations is typical of much of the world, our study has implications for the development of these areas as well. The latest Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) description of Taiwan’s growth in 2006 is that it exceeded 4 percent (see CIA [2004]). Thus, any drag on Taiwan’s development from the negative effects of the divorcement between voting rights and cash flow rights may
be relatively muted, although it is impossible to know what Taiwan’s economic
growth would have been in the absence of the relationships explored here.
Given the results reported here, it seems useful to ask what other factors
might lead to the negative relationship between ownership structure and patent
quantity and quality. Some issues that should be addressed in future research
include (1) identifying differences between the firms in how they organize themselves, (2) scanning the environment for new opportunities, ( 3 ) weighting future
returns against short-range investment opportunities, (4) choosing among reinvestment strategies, and (5) seeking to diversify their productive ability portfolio away from innovation. Furthermore, efforts should also be made to
understand how resources not invested in R&D are used.
The limitations of this study are that it is based on only one East Asian
country, Taiwan, which may have its own peculiar institutional and cultural features. These features, as Peng (2003) may have argued, shape the particular economic, cultural, and information environment that Taiwanese majority and
minority shareholders face. In Taiwan, the legal and institutional structures facing owner-controlled firms, where a divergence between voting rights and cash
flow rights exists, gives the firm incentives to both extract and conceal private
control benefits from minority shareholders. To the extent that the Taiwanese
environment differs from that in other East Asian countries, as well as in other
countries, different results may be obtained. It is important, though, to overcome
the most important limitation of this study-that
it was conducted in one
country-by
conducting similar research in other nations. Through this means,
the research enterprise can be enriched by enabling the creation of a broader
understanding of the interaction of national cultures and institutional settings
with economic behavior.
The success of the Asian Tigers serves as a strongly positive model to the
rest of the world. The result of this study underlines, however, the impact of
corporate governance on innovation and investment decisions, and therefore illustrates key concerns in the finance literature about corporate controllers’ stewardship
of investor assets.
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